Banking Environment, Agency Costs, and Loan Syndication : A Cross-Country Analysis

Bank loan syndicate structure can be considered as an organizational response to agency problems stemming from the syndication process. The banking environment also influences the syndication process. We investigate how syndicate structure is influenced by the characteristics of the banking environment, such as banking market structure, financial development, banking regulation and supervision, and legal risk. The results of a cross-country analysis performed on a sample of 15,586 syndicated loan facilities from 24 countries over a period of 15 years confirm that syndicate structure is influenced by banking environments consistent with agency costs minimization and efficient re-contracting objectives.Banking environment, Agency costs, Loan syndication, Syndicate structure.

Syndicated Loans in Emerging Markets

There has been a considerable expansion of the volume of syndicated loans in emerging markets in the recent years. We provide the first analysis of the determinants of the decision of banks to syndicate a loan on a sample of loan facilities from 50 emerging countries. We show the significant role of loan characteristics and of financial development, banking regulation, and legal institutions, on the decision to syndicate a loan. We support the efforts of authorities to increase banking competition and efficiency, and to implement binding banking regulation on capital requirement to promote the expansion of syndicated loans.Bank, Loan, Syndication, Emerging Markets, Logit Regressions.

How many banks does it take to lend? Empirical evidence from Europe

We provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the number of bank lenders using a sample of more than 3000 loans to firms from 24 European countries. Our testable hypotheses are built upon different theoretical frameworks drawn from the existing literature, referring to firm characteristics, strategic considerations, geographical distances, bank market concentration, efficiency of legal system, and development of alternative sources of funds. Our main results show that the number and the international diversity of lenders is increased by loan and firm characteristics which reduce agency costs, and by financial structure and legal environment characteristics which mitigate expropriation risk.Lending relationships, number of lenders, bank loans, financial governance, asymmetric information, Europe.

Collateral and Adverse Selection in Transition Countries

This paper tackles the question of knowing whether collateral helps solve adverse selection problems in transition countries. We use a unique dataset of about 400 bank loans from 16 transition countries. Our findings support the view of a positive link between the presence of collateral and the risk premium, which is in accordance with the observed-risk hypothesis. This suggests that collateral does not mitigate adverse selection problems in transition countries.Bank, collateral, transition economies.

Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China

This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. In line with theoretical literature, ownership concentration of the borrowing firm is assumed to influence information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender. We analyze how ownership concentration influences the participation of foreign banks in a loan syndicate using a sample of syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004-2009 for which we have information on ownership concentration. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. Additional estimations using alternative specifications provide similar results. As foreign banks do not react positively to ownership concentration, we conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China. Moreover, it appears that increased financial leverage discourages foreign bank participation, suggesting that domestic banks are less cautious in their risk management.bank; foreign investors; information asymmetry; loan; syndication; China

Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans

This paper considers whether local bank participation exerts an impact on the spreads for syndicated loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we test whether local banks possess a superior ability to deal with information asymmetries. Using a sample of 528 syndicated loans to Russian borrowers, we perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on local bank participation and the characteristics of loans and borrowers. Unlike earlier studies, we distinguish foreign banks with a local presence from those without such presence. The intuition here is that a local presence may influence a foreign bank’s monitoring ability and access to information about borrowers. We observe no significant impact on the spread when there is local bank participation in a syndicated loan, nor do we find any significant influence of the presence of domestic-owned banks or foreign-owned banks on the spread. Additional estimations considering subsamples with exacerbated information asymmetries provide similar results. Therefore our conclusion is that local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in Russia.bank; information asymmetry; loan; syndication; Russia

What Drives the Arrangement Timetable of Bank Loan Syndication ?

We investigate the influence of loan and syndicate characteristics and information disclosure and legal environment factors on the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndications (measured as the time elapsed from the launching until the completion of the deal) from 68 countries over the 1992-2006 period. Employing accelerated failure time models from survival analysis methodology, we find that loan, syndicate, legal environment and information disclosure characteristics which reduce agency problems related to syndication reduce the arrangement timetable. Among the country level characteristics, information disclosure which reduces moral hazard due to informational frictions between syndicate members appears to be the most important driver of a faster deal arrangement timetable, while better creditor rights protection increase the arrangement timetable, consistently with recontracting risk issues.Syndicated loans arrangement timetable, Agency problems, Information disclosure, Legal risk, Survival analysis, Accelerated failure time models.

Stock market reaction to debt financing arrangements in Russia

This paper investigates stock market reaction to debt arrangements in Russia. The analysis of the valuation of debt arrangements by stock markets provides information about the use of debt by Russian companies. We apply the event study methodology to check whether debt announcements lead to abnormal returns using a sample of Russian listed companies that issued syndicated loans or bonds between June 2004 and December 2008. We find a negative reaction of stock markets to debt arrangements that can be explained by moral hazard behavior of shareholders at the expense of debtholders. Further, we observe no significant difference between announcements of syndicated loans and bonds. Thus, our findings support the view that Russian companies could have incentives to limit their reliance on external debt.corporate bonds; event study; Russia; stock returns; syndicated loans

Les déterminants de la décision de syndication bancaire en France

On étudie dans cet article les facteurs susceptibles d’influencer la décision de syndiquer un prêt bancaire en France sur la période 1990-2006. On propose un modèle empirique de la syndication bancaire en intégrant les caractéristiques du contrat de prêt ainsi que des variables de structure bancaire et financière. La taille, le type, le motif et le taux de référence du prêt exercent une influence significative sur la décision de syndication. Celle-ci est également influencée par le développement du marché de la dette. Il apparaît que la décision de syndiquer un prêt bancaire en France est principalement motivée par les avantages en terme de diversification et de transfert du risque, par le financement d’objectif spécifique et par les revenus du spread.Banque, prêt, syndication, France, logit.

Le Rôle de l'Environnement Réglementaire, Légal et Institutionnel dans la Défaillance des BanquesLe Cas des Pays Emergents

Cet article étudie l'impact des facteurs institutionnels et réglementaires sur la défaillance des banques des pays émergents. Peu de travaux se sont intéressés à la défaillance bancaire dans ces pays. Or, la qualité des institutions telles que les commissions de régulation et de surveillance prudentielles ou les assureurs des dépôts, peut y favoriser l'excès de risque, et donc la probabilité de défaut des banques. Celle-ci est modélisée en utilisant un modèle logit à deux étapes appliqué à un échantillon de banques de pays émergents. Les résultats confirment le rôle des facteurs réglementaires et institutionnels dans la création d'incitations à l'excès de risque. En particulier, la qualité de l'état de droit est un ingrédient crucial pour une réglementation efficace et crédible.Excès de risque de crédit, défaillance bancaire, pays émergents, facteurs institutionnels et réglementaires, modèle logit à deux étapes.